Three prejudices against terrorism more

This article was downloaded by: [Kaplan, Shawn] On: 10 September 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 914710001] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Critical Studies on Terrorism Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t780786797 Three prejudices against terrorism Shawn Kaplan a a Department of Philosophy, Adelphi University, Garden City, NY, USA Online Publication Date: 01 August 2009 To cite this Article Kaplan, Shawn(2009)'Three prejudices against terrorism',Critical Studies on Terrorism,2:2,181 — 199 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17539150903010285 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150903010285 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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Kaplan Critical Studies on Terrorism Department of Philosophy, Adelphi University, Garden City, NY, USA (Received 17 March 2008; final version received 23 April 2009) This article criticises three assumptions regarding terrorism and the agents who carry it out: (1) terrorists are always indiscriminate in their targeting; (2) terrorism is never effective in combating oppression; and (3) terrorists never participate in fair negotiations, as they merely wish to switch places with their oppressors. By criticising these three prejudices against terrorism, the article does not attempt to justify or excuse terrorism generally nor in the specific case of Sri Lanka which is examined. Instead, it creates the necessary room for such justifications or excuses to be critically appraised by dismantling some popular myths surrounding terrorism. Keywords: terrorism; definition; war crimes; Sri Lanka; LTTE; Michael Walzer, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Introduction Should terrorism be categorically excluded as a morally justifiable or morally excusable means of combating social or political oppression? This question is constructed with a limited, yet significant, scope. To answer it, I will not attempt to show any specific act of terrorism to be morally justified or morally excusable. A moral justification generally provides reasons for why that act, or the intention behind it, is right or permissible. To morally justify an act of terrorism would require working out in full either the extent to which just war principles apply to acts of terrorism or developing an alternative theory to evaluate terrorist acts. In contrast, a moral excuse recognises the wrongness of the act or intention but argues that the agent is not blameworthy given the extremity of the circumstances.1 To provide a moral excuse for an act of terrorism would require detailing why some specific set of circumstances would be sufficient for overriding the moral principles that were used in judging it to be wrong. While a thorough and critical examination of the possible moral justifications and moral excuses for terrorist acts is very much needed, so often a meaningful debate on these questions is circumvented by a set of prejudicial assumptions that lead to a hasty, categorical condemnation of all terrorist acts. In this article, I address three such prejudicial assumptions which leave little room in political and academic discourse for asking whether a specific terrorist act is justifiable or excusable from a moral point of view. Much of the discourse on terrorism is dominated by such categorical condemnations as: ‘No one these days advocates terrorism, not even those who regularly practice it. The practice is indefensible now that it has been recognized, like rape and murder, as an attack upon the innocent’ (Walzer 2004, p. 51). Or, as another noted political theorist has stated: *Email: kaplan@adelphi.edu ISSN 1753-9153 print/ISSN 1753-9161 online © 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/17539150903010285 http://www.informaworld.com 182 S. Kaplan Terrorism, on the other hand, is always unjust. It is distinctive of terrorism that it consists of acts of indiscriminate violence directed at civilians or non-hostile personnel, in order to terrorize them, or their governments, into carrying out or submitting to the demands of the terrorists. (Simpson 2004, p. 161) Also, consider the language of UN Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999) which calls for ‘Condemning all acts of terrorism, irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed’. Many theorists either categorically reject terrorism on moral grounds (Khatchadourian 1988, Lomasky 1991, French 2003, Simpson 2004, Nathanson 2006) or only allow for theoretical excuses based upon hypotheticals which are not in fact ever invoked in reality (Narveson 1991, Primoratz 1997, Walzer 2004). What is it about political terrorism that leads many to disallow the mere possibility of justification or excuse when a case is allowed to be made for a wide variety of other forms of political violence (e.g., sabotage, assassinations, guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare)? Most often, terrorism is categorically rejected on the basis of three fundamental assumptions regarding the nature of terrorism and the agents who carry it out. These premises are concerned with: (1) whether terrorists can ever target discriminately, (2) whether terrorism can ever be effective in combating oppression, and (3) whether terrorists can ever participate in meaningful and fair negotiations. To deny any of these three possibilities would create a very strong prejudice against terrorism ever being a legitimate means for combating oppression. In the first instance, if terrorism always fails to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets (e.g., by always targeting ‘innocent’ non-combatants), then the injustice of this means is evident from the standpoint of traditional just war theory and can at best only be excused under emergency circumstances. If, however, terrorism is never effective in combating oppression, then it could not typically be excused even under the heading of emergency ethics. Last, if resorting to terrorism automatically excludes one from participating in a legitimate political process of negotiation and settlement, then it is hard to imagine how terrorism would really combat oppression instead of simply changing the position of the oppressed with the oppressor. While many morally condemn all acts of terrorism based upon the assumption that terrorists always target indiscriminately, Michael Walzer has used this presumption of indiscriminate targeting to argue in favour of the third prejudice. He argues that by targeting individuals at random from a larger noncombatant population, terrorists send the message that ‘We will not accept you or make our peace with you as fellow-citizens or partners in any political project. You are not candidates for equality or even co-existence’ (Walzer 2006a, p. 5). Regardless of their claims to the contrary, Walzer believes that terrorists – by targeting non-combatants – indicate a disinterest in reaching a mutually accommodating peace through negotiation. He proposes that terrorists attempt to tyrannically impose their will upon their opposition, whether that be to force them from the territory or to so disenfranchise them that a negotiated peace is unnecessary. From this point of view, terrorists violate the jus in bello principle of noncombatant immunity in a way which undermines the possibility of jus post bellum. While each individual assumption establishes a powerful negative presumption against a resort to terrorism, to deny all three possibilities, as does Walzer (2004), creates an overwhelming prejudice against using terrorism as a means to combat oppression and injustice. While the issue of terrorism’s effectiveness in combating oppression or the ability of terrorists to participate in legitimate political negotiations may appear to be questions to be answered purely by historical analysis, the definition of terrorism one adopts will, however, determine what histories will be analysed. When one considers whether terrorists Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Critical Studies on Terrorism 183 ever target discriminately, the definition is paramount, as many propose that terrorism always targets ‘innocent’ non-combatants (Narveson 1991, Chomsky 2001, Sterba 2003, Coady 2004a, Primoratz 2004a, Rodin 2004, Walzer 2004). To simply present historical examples of terrorists attacking in a discriminate fashion will have little persuasive power in challenging this assumption, if such examples can be rejected by definitional fiat. At the same time, proposing an alternative definition which allows for discriminate attacks will not be persuasive either to those who identify terrorist violence primarily by its supposed targeting of non-combatants. In order to move beyond this seemingly intractable disagreement, I will argue that there is a good philosophical reason for excluding indiscriminate targeting from the definition of terrorism, viz. that it makes terrorism indistinct from too many other forms of violence – from civilian massacres to genocide. I will also argue that the traditional responses to my criticism either fail to make the definition any more precise or introduce new and equally weighty problems. Afterwards, I will propose an alternative, functionalist definition of terrorism so as to be able to engage in an analysis of historical cases. Without doing so first, any reference to historical cases will only lead to an unproductive series of claims and counterclaims contesting the legitimacy of the chosen examples. Before proceeding, we must consider what might be hoped for in a reasonable definition of terrorism and how my functionalist approach relates. Like most terms used to express political phenomena, terrorism is a contested concept. We ought not to expect the technical precision of scientific definitions. While terrorism is tactical, it is not characterised by an unchanging list of methods and tactics. Terrorism is an umbrella concept encompassing a broad and changeable set of phenomena. As such, I will seek a definition that presents the core qualities by which these phenomena are united by ‘family resemblance’, rather than to seek the necessary and sufficient conditions of terrorism. In addition, terrorism is a sub-category of violence. Violence itself has an instrumental character; it is a means to any number of possible ends. If we acknowledge that terrorism shares this instrumental quality with the broader genus, then my focus upon the distinct instrumental form of terrorist violence may be the best way to distinguish terrorism from other types of violence. To distinguish between the different instrumental forms of violence that may be operative in, for example, conventional military violence in contrast to terrorism does not necessarily commit one to making a moral distinction between these forms. Instead, it poses the question of whether terrorist violence functions in a distinct manner. Important for this article, in particular, is that the instrument of terrorism does not require indiscriminate targeting to operate or function. To clarify what I mean by differing instrumental forms of violence, reflect upon the following contrast. On the one hand, consider the next three hypothetical cases. A people living under a tyrant assassinate their ruler. A nation fearing a new weapons programme of their traditional adversary preventively attack a munitions plant. Last, a revolutionary insurgency attacks a local military or police outpost. In each case, violent force is used as a means to directly accomplish some end. The damage inflicted by each hypothetical attack is the direct means for: eliminating the tyrant, removing a perceived threat to national security, or defeating the standing government. Now consider the next group of three actual cases: the 9/11 attacks upon the United States, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the bombings of London’s public transport system in 2005. The terrorist violence in these three cases functions differently than in the previously posed examples of political violence. These terrorist attacks also had aims (perhaps multiple ones); for example, to oppose US support of Israel and US military presence in Saudi Arabia, to affect the 2004 Spanish national elections, and to bring British involvement in Iraq to an Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 184 S. Kaplan Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 end. In each case, the damage inflicted was not a direct means for attaining these political aims. Whatever effect these terrorist attacks had was indirect via the fear produced – not directly by the damage inflicted. Violence can function as either a direct or indirect means. To distinguish between instrumental forms of violence in this way does not imply a moral distinction. It is not a priori better or worse to resort to one instrumental form of violence versus the other. While I have not yet made the case that the proposed indirect instrumental form of terrorist violence ought to be made part of a reasonable definition of terrorism, I intend to show this approach to be important for understanding terrorism in its full moral and political diversity. In what follows, I will question the wisdom of defining terrorism as an indiscriminate attack upon ‘innocent’ non-combatants on both philosophical and historical grounds. The functionalist definition I defend will also allow for a historical analysis of the terrorist activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka which shows the assumptions that terrorism cannot be effective and that terrorists are closed to negotiating political settlements to their grievances to be over-simplifications. By criticising these three prejudices against terrorism, I am not attempting to justify or excuse terrorism generally nor in the specific case of Sri Lanka. Instead, I am creating the necessary room for such justifications or excuses to be critically and concretely appraised by dismantling the popular myths surrounding terrorism. Defining terrorism Terrorism, war crimes, and genocide To help ground the discussion of the first prejudice, I will examine C.A.J. Coady’s definition of terrorism that emphasises indiscriminate targeting, and I will demonstrate the imprecision of this approach. Coady (2004a, p. 5) proposes that terrorism is ‘the organized use of violence to attack non-combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or their property for political purposes’. As an ‘organized use of violence’ against non-combatants, Coady’s definition conceives of indiscriminate targeting in the sense of failing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Leaving aside for the moment the broader questions of how non-combatants are ‘innocent’ such that their immunity in times of military conflict is preserved and where the line between combatant and non-combatant should be drawn, Coady’s definition makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish with precision between acts of terrorism and many war crimes.2 Any military violence deliberately inflicted upon non-combatants, and that fails to satisfy the Doctrine of Double Effect is traditionally considered to be a war crime. Following Coady, war crimes that deliberately target non-combatants in an organised fashion – for example, genocide, ethnic cleansing, carpet bombing, civilian massacres, sexual crimes, torture or violence against captives, the burning of villages, and any foreseeable ‘collateral damage’ that is not excused by the Doctrine of Double Effect – will all be automatically categorised as terrorism. Diverse traditions have long held prohibitions on such crimes and resisted the current impulse to reduce all such wrongs to terrorism. Why circumvent the linguistic and phenomenal distinctions that hold between genocide, civilian massacre, the mass destruction of non-combatant property, and terrorism? Goodin (2006, pp. 21–22) argues that this current impulse to conflate terrorism and war crimes generally arises from the pragmatic concern of international lawyers to place terrorist acts under the legal conventions that already exist against war crimes. While Goodin concedes the pragmatic point that in the absence of international laws against terrorism, it is Critical Studies on Terrorism 185 better to treat all terrorists ‘as if’ they are war criminals, this doesn’t mean that they are morally or politically one and the same. This is a significant point considering our concern for the categorical condemnations of terrorism. By defining terrorism such that it is grouped together with actions that are worthy of categorical condemnation (e.g., genocide or military massacres of non-combatants), one runs the risk of being blinded to the potential moral and political differences. Genocide can never have the goal of eliminating social or political oppression. It is an incomparable act of oppression in itself and, thus, worthy of categorical condemnation. Similarly, the wartime massacre of non-combatants can never directly serve the goal of liberating a people and ought in principle to only elicit condemnation. The move by Coady and others who characterise terrorist violence as an attack upon non-combatants makes terrorism morally and politically indistinct from heinous crimes that we categorically condemn. Terrorism, however, is far more politically and morally diverse than the sorts of crimes this approach lumps it together with. Unlike the ideological purposes war crimes, genocide, and similar atrocities aim at, terrorist groups are often fighting for a national homeland, or to bring some form of oppression to an end. At the same time, not all terrorist actions directly attack the innocent with lethal force. While carrying out their campaigns, terrorists have been known to: make threats, make public shows of force, take hostages, destroy symbolically significant property, societal infrastructure, or military equipment, as well as provide warnings and choose less populated areas for their bombings. Making terrorism equivalent to categorically condemnable war crimes by definition allows for the universal condemnation of terrorism without having to examine the goals and methods of specific terrorist attacks. I believe this doesn’t bring us to an understanding of the political or moral relevance of specific terrorist attacks, nor of terrorism generally, but propagates a myth whereby people avoid asking these important questions. To evade such questions may provide a cloak of moral certainty but one that may be blinding for all the comfort it may provide. One can attempt to avoid the conflation between war crimes and terrorism implicit in Coady’s approach by claiming, as Primoratz (2004a, p. 24) does, that terrorism is an indiscriminate attack upon non-combatants which always aims to coerce some third party.3 However, while wartime civilian massacres or acts of genocide may not intend to coerce some broader public or third party, Coady (2004a, p. 6) counters that the same can be said of many terrorists actions that seemingly aim at either publicity or provoking a rash response. While publicity or provocation can be part of a coercive campaign, they need not be. Hence, to solely distinguish terrorism from war crimes by supposing it has a coercive aim is misleading and makes the definition too narrow. In addition to Coady’s suggested alternatives, one can add that some terrorist acts may simply express moral outrage, anger, or hatred. Again, an expressive aim for terrorism needn’t be part of a coercive campaign but can stand as an independent purpose (Lomasky 1991). Another attempt to avoid Coady’s conflation may come by adding a qualification that the indiscriminate attack cannot be carried out by a state. Such a significant limitation on terrorist agency is, however, highly questionable. Whether one considers Stalin’s Soviet Union or Pinochet’s Chile, there are too many examples of states that have resorted to terrorising their own citizens (Glover 1991). In addition, the possibility of states using or sponsoring terrorism against other states or territories shouldn’t be ruled out by the definition of terrorism (Primoratz 2004b). What makes terrorism distinct? Given that terrorism is able to serve as a means to a diverse number of aims beside coercion and that state terrorism exists, it becomes difficult to distinguish terrorism, as defined Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 186 S. Kaplan by Coady, from many other acts of indiscriminate violence during wartime. As indiscriminate targeting can occur for the sake of military expediency, perceived military necessity or ideological ends, it fails to demarcate terrorism from military and genocidal violence in general. Some claim, however, that there is no great distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence. In this vein, Honderich (2002) provides a singular definition of political violence and terrorism which concentrates on the issue of legally sanctioned violence: We can speak of one thing as either terrorism or political violence, making no difference between the two terms. That thing is violence with a political and social intention, whether or not intended to put people in general in fear, and raising a question of its moral justification – either illegal violence within a society or smaller-scale violence than war between states or societies and not according to international law. (Honderich 2002, pp. 98–99) Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Following Honderich, international terrorism is political violence that is smaller scaled than war and is not sanctioned by international law, whereas domestic terrorism is simply politically motivated violence which is illegal within the society – regardless of whether it has a state or non-state agent and regardless of the scale of the violence. It must be remembered that a legal sanction is not equivalent to a moral justification. Hence, terrorism in Honderich’s account remains, in principle, on equivalent moral standing as the legally sanctioned violence of security forces. There are several immediate problems to be found within Honderich definition that go beyond our immediate concern.4 Honderich’s central contention that terrorism and illegal political violence are one and the same needs to be examined. Let’s consider the advantages which Honderich claims for his approach and ask whether they are truly advantageous, truly attained, or cannot be attained while still preserving a useful distinction between terrorism and other small-scale forms of illegal political violence. Ironically, Honderich proposes as an advantage that his definition follows ‘common usage’ by excluding a necessary link to fear or terror (Honderich 2002, p. 99). While Honderich may diverge from the common usage of terrorism in many senses, he seeks to preserve a usage that includes acts such as past IRA bombings which didn’t necessarily elicit fear or terror for people’s personal safety. Also, in Northern Ireland, decades of bombings and shootings eventually gave rise to a kind of resigned quiet fear, something like an accepted condition of life. It is closer to the mark to say that this political violence, in addition to being a matter of hatred and vengeance, eventually aimed to secure social ends not by putting people in lively fear, but simply by killing people. That is, the situation was more akin to armed struggle or war than the American situation after September 11. (Honderich 2002, pp. 97–98) Honderich raises this point to support his contention that terrorism should not be conceived as political violence plus the intent to terrorise some population. This, however, is an odd argument. To conclude that fear or terror is not intended because it wasn’t attained is a clear fallacy. Even by Honderich’s own account, it was only after decades of IRA bombings that these attacks became part of the daily fabric of lived experience and, thus, did not elicit any ‘lively fear’. The fact that this occurred could readily be explained by the degree of discrimination that the IRA tended to use, for example, by providing warnings or targeting less populated areas. A campaign of escalating indiscriminate violence might have maintained the lively fear initially experienced. It should also be remembered that some acts of violence will simply fail to be effective. There can Critical Studies on Terrorism 187 be attempts at terrorism that fail to elicit sufficient fear or terror to be effective – either because such acts have become assimilated into normal life or they lack sufficient violent force. That some terrorist attacks do not function well – they do not elicit sufficient fear or terror – does not rule out that terrorist violence functions by eliciting a specific type of fear or terror as a means to further ends. The bottom line is that the common usage of terrorism that includes past IRA attacks which failed to elicit ‘lively fear’ can be explained without equating all illegal, small-scaled political violence with terrorism; nor is it necessary to deny the instrumental role of fear of terror in order to preserve this common usage of terrorism. Honderich (2002, pp. 99–100) names three additional advantages of his definition. In the first place, his definition is flexible enough to allow: for state-terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism to exist, for state-terrorism to be the more destructive form, and for wars to be morally worse than terrorism because of their greater scale of violence. While it is advantageous to have a definition of terrorism which provides flexibility regarding agency and doesn’t support a strong bias in favour of legally sanctioned violence, these are not advantages which require that we equate all illegal, small-scaled political violence with terrorism. There are many definitions of terrorism that remain flexible on the issue of agency and, so long as one avoids indiscriminate targeting as a key element, one’s definition needn’t support a strong moral prejudice against terrorism as compared to war. Second, Honderich points out that his definition excludes institutional ‘violence’ such as racism, sexism, and systematic economic inequalities. Similarly, while one can readily agree with Honderich that alternative language than ‘terrorism’ is needed to describe institutional injustices, there is little to suggest that one can only, or best, preserve this distinction by identifying terrorism as illegal, small-scale political violence. It may be telling that Honderich preserves a linguistic distinction between institutional violence and terrorism but not between terrorism and political violence. It appears that he only wishes to maintain a linguistic distinction when he believes there is a moral distinction to be preserved. The damage done to human lives by racism, sexism, and grave institutionally based economic inequalities is never justifiable for Honderich; whereas, terrorism and political violence are potentially justified in effectively removing such hindrances to better lives. Honderich holds as the greatest advantage to his definition of terrorism that it ‘does not by itself morally condemn in a final way everything that falls under it’ (2002, p. 99). In other words, it doesn’t beg the moral question and, for this, I agree it should be applauded. It is less than convincing that equating terrorism with all illegal, small-scale political violence is the only (or best) avenue by which one can avoid begging this moral question. Let us return to the contrasting examples of political violence and terrorism raised earlier in the article. On the one hand, there were three hypothetical cases: the assassination of a tyrant, a state’s preventive attack upon a foreign nation’s munitions plant, and the revolutionary insurgency’s attack upon a military outpost. Each is an instance of small-scale, illegal political violence whose damage serves as a direct instrument to the political aims of the actors. In contrast, the three terrorist attacks listed (9–11, the Madrid train bombings, and the bombings of London’s public transport system) each inflicted damage that could only contribute indirectly to the goals of the actors. That each of these attacks may have elicited different degrees of fear in the public or have had varying degrees of effectiveness in attaining their goals does not take away from them having an indirect form of instrumentality. While these three actual attacks may meet with reasonable condemnation, they do not owe such condemnation to having an indirect instrumental form of violence. By including in an account of terrorism that the damage inflicted operates indirectly by means of the fear or terror elicited, one also avoids begging the moral question. Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 188 S. Kaplan At the same time, this approach doesn’t reduce all small-scale, illegal political violence into one indistinguishable mass. Preserving this distinction between the instrumental forms of violence serves the important purpose of allowing people to ask whether terrorism may be effective when other instrumental forms of violence may not be, or vice versa. Violence which primarily elicits fear or terror can have greater effect in some contexts than violence that primarily inflicts damage. (The case of the LTTE taken up in the second half of this article is interesting, in part, because it shows an occasion when a resort to an indirect instrumental form of violence has had greater success than either a nonviolent approach or violence with a direct instrumental form.)5 In addition, a focus upon the instrumental forms of violence maintains distinct advantages over other approaches which attempt to distinguish terrorism by either focusing upon the historically contingent standard of ‘unconventional tactics’ terrorists use or the supposed intention of terrorists to coerce. In regard to using coercive intent as the feature that differentiates terrorism from other violence, I agree with Coady’s position that terrorism may often have other aims than coercing a third party. Seeking publicity or retribution, expressing emotions like hatred or moral outrage or hoping to provoke extreme and unjust responses, are all likely intentions of terrorists – none of which directly requires the coercive intimidation of a third party. In addition, relying upon the intention of the agent as the basis for categorising acts as terrorism is rather problematic. Whose intention should really matter: the individual(s) who directly carry out the act, the person(s) who plan the act, the organisation which is credited with the act or the person(s) who fund the act? The problems mount when the analysis of intention approaches large collectives like a terrorist network; can such an entity even have an intention? While it is likely that an examination of intent will be necessary when morally evaluating specific terrorist acts, it is counterproductive to engage in such an examination at the level of definition and categorisation. As terrorism is an instrument for obtaining a diverse and unfixed number of aims (not merely coercion), the better avenue for understanding how terrorism is distinct from other forms of violence is to examine how terrorism functions. Whereas many forms of violence obtain their ends directly by the damage inflicted, the threatened or actual violence of terrorism functions indirectly via the fear or terror produced. For example, the violence inflicted in conventional military conflicts typically aims at victory by producing enough damage to life, resources, and societal infrastructure such that the opponent’s continued fighting is too costly. While intimidation and generating fear in the opposition comes into play when seeking military victory, it is not the primary means of that victory but usually functions as a secondary consequence of the strategic damage inflicted.6 In contrast, terrorists attempt to elicit sufficient fear or terror regarding the security of human life or fundamental rights so as to be able to obtain their ends. In addition, unlike the armed robber who by threatening ‘your money or your life’ elicits sufficient fear or terror regarding the security of human life in the here and now, the terrorist’s instrument of fear or terror always carries with it either an explicit or implicit threat of separate acts of future violence. Thus, according to my functionalist account, terrorism is an act or threat of violence to persons or property that elicits terror, fear, or anxiety regarding the security of human life or fundamental rights and that functions as an instrument to obtain further ends. This instrumentality relies upon either an explicit or implicit threat of separate acts of future violence.7 This definition of terrorism captures a wide variety of politically and non-politically motivated actions by way of a family resemblance. As a mode of actual or threatened violence, terrorism shares with the broader concept of violence an instrumental quality that needn’t limit it to ‘political’ aims. By emphasising within the definition the instrumental Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Critical Studies on Terrorism 189 Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 role of terror, the magnitude of harm inflicted or threatened, as well as the future orientation of terrorist violence and threats, the proposal provides a set of core features that differentiates terrorism from other types of violence. At the same time, the penumbra surrounding these core qualities – terrorist intentions and targets – provides a flexibility whereby wholesale judgements concerning the justifiability of terrorism cannot be made. Instead, a more concrete analysis is required for each case or type of terrorism. The proposed definition also allows terrorism to be distinguished from many war crimes that result from indiscriminate targeting, while not falling prey to the problems associated with focusing upon either unconventional tactics or the intentions of terrorists. Most importantly, the proposed definition dissolves the supposed necessary link between terrorism and the targeting of ‘innocent’ non-combatants and is able to explain why terrorists are so often indiscriminate. In the first instance, whatever tactics and targets are sufficient for generating an instrumental terror regarding the security of life and basic liberties satisfies the account. Hence, terrorism does not require indiscriminate targeting to function. At the same time, indiscriminate targeting will be much more effective in eliciting a more widespread and powerful sense of terror. Terrorists who begin by targeting in a discriminate fashion may eventually feel pressure to become less discriminate as their attacks become a more normalised experience. Summation I have argued in the foregoing sections that there is a good philosophical reason for excluding indiscriminate targeting from a definition of terrorism. The inclusion of indiscriminate targeting within the definition leads to placing terrorism in the same class of violence as genocide and wartime massacres of civilians which are both categorically condemnable. Such a lumping together tends to blind us to the moral and political diversity of terrorist acts – the diversity of aims and methods. In addition, I have argued that an approach to defining terrorism which emphasises the instrumental employment of fear or terror is a reasonable approach as it: avoids begging the moral question, maintains the possibility of state terrorism, does not limit terrorism to the singular aim of coercion, does not make the intention of the agents central for categorising acts as terrorism, and preserves a distinction between terrorism and illegal, small-scale political violence such that we can still consider the possibility that terrorism has a distinct effectiveness. It is my hope that the proposed definition can serve as a basis for overcoming the unproductive debate over what can stand as a reasonable example of terrorism. Still, any reasonable definition of terrorism that allows for discriminate attacks would ring hollow if there were no historical examples to substantiate the challenge to the prejudice that terrorists are always indiscriminate. Thus, to further dissociate terrorism from indiscriminate targeting and to challenge the other two prejudices, I will examine the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Walzer’s three prejudices Discriminate targeting Before delving into the history of the Tamil fight for independence in Sri Lanka, some greater clarity is needed regarding what constitutes discriminate targeting. Traditionally, there are two broad ways to conceive of legitimate military targets. The more permissive approach maintains a focus upon issues of moral responsibility, either individual or collective. Those who ascribe to this general approach often claim that unarmed citizens can be 190 S. Kaplan Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 held culpable for their state’s wrongdoing, thus offering little immunity from attack. Walzer’s more restrictive approach concentrates upon who is a direct threat of harm to the opposition insofar as they ‘bear arms “effectively”’ or are directly engaged in the business of war (Walzer 2000, pp. 144–146). Accordingly, most citizens who do not work in munitions factories and the like should be immune from attack. Given that my immediate aim is to illustrate that terrorism can in fact be discriminate, I will concentrate on the more restrictive account in this section. If the LTTE can be shown to use terrorism that satisfies the more conservative standard for discrimination, then there should be little doubt of history supporting the existence of discriminate terrorism. While Walzer’s theory of non-combatant immunity can be challenged on various levels, it is especially unclear how to apply Walzer’s standard of legitimate targets to the context of political terrorism. In the case of conventional warfare, the danger posed by the opposition’s soldiers is relatively transparent. While who stands as a direct threat to harming a military force can be complicated by guerilla tactics, the notion of what kind of harm is delimited by others bearing arms effectively. In the context of terrorism, what kind of harm poses a direct enough danger to make targets legitimate is less obvious. For a minority group seeking independence from an oppressive regime or political concessions towards equal rights and who take up terrorist means towards these ends, both the military and police can effectively bear arms against them. At the same time, a direct threat of harm could perhaps be generated by: political leaders or parties with oppressive policies, possible turncoats in their own ranks, an unconcerned or unsympathetic majority, as well as factions within their own minority population who are in league with their opponent. The point of difference is that for a group fighting for their own liberty, the oppressive conditions that already exist do them harm. Thus, not only do those who oppose them by bearing arms pose a threat of harm, but also those people who simply wish to maintain the status quo motivated from self-interest, racial or ethnic prejudice, or simply indifference. Walzer’s arguments It might be argued that my brief examination of who could possibly be viewed as a direct threat to harm an oppressed group too greatly weakens Walzer’s principle of non-combatant immunity. Walzer (2004) himself avoids these questions by asserting that terrorism is always indiscriminate. When he does consider those groups fighting for independence or basic liberties and who are vastly weaker than their opponents, he assumes that either their grievances can be addressed by non-violently generating public support for constitutional reforms or that such a democratic approach is impossible because they confront some totalitarian oppressor (Walzer 2004, pp. 54–56). In the second case, Walzer believes that the terror of the totalitarian regime will always trump that of any revolutionary group. Half of his supporting argument is based upon the dubious assumption that all terrorism is indiscriminate. In that case, why would a totalitarian regime that terrorises its own population care if its citizens are targeted by others? Walzer’s more poignant claim is that the terror apparatus of a totalitarian regime will always outweigh whatever the rebels can muster. However, historical examples show a more complicated picture than Walzer depicts. The disjunct that either a democratic reform process can prevail without resorting to terrorism, or terrorism will be ineffective versus a totalitarian opponent, proves to be a false dichotomy. The dichotomy can be challenged not only by showing that some examples of terrorism have been partially effective (Young 2004), but by recognising that terrorism is a tool for consolidating political support. Bloom (2005) has made the empirical case in regard to both Palestine and Sri Lanka that the respective oppositional groups have undertaken Critical Studies on Terrorism 191 suicide bombing campaigns only to the extent that it garnered them support among their disenfranchised constituency. For those people excluded from the political process or who have come to find constitutional measures ineffective over long periods of time, support will generally be offered to those willing and capable of fighting on their behalf. Thus, garnering public support and using terrorism cannot simply be placed in two absolutely exclusive categories. While Walzer (2004, p. 66) acknowledges that ‘[m]ovement terrorists win support because they pretend to deal energetically and effectively with the brutality of the state’, he maintains that terrorists are only interested in imposing their own solutions onto the situation, not in negotiating a mutually accommodating settlement. He goes as far as to suggest that even if the oppression terrorists claim to combat is eliminated by others, they will not be satisfied: They [the terrorists] would still need to be defeated, for what they are after is not a solution to the problem but rather power to impose their own solution. No decent end [i.e. a fairly negotiated peace] to the conflict in Ireland, or in Lebanon, or in the Middle East generally, is going to look like a victory for terrorism – if only because the different groups of terrorists are each committed, by the strategy they have adopted, to an indecent end [i.e. one that fails to fairly accommodate the opposition in a just peace settlement]. (Walzer 2004, pp. 63–64) Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Again, it is the strategy of indiscriminate targeting that signals to Walzer the terrorists’ supposed unwillingness to fairly negotiate for peace.8 Based upon the presumption of indiscriminate targeting, Walzer assumes that resorting to terrorism automatically removes one from legitimate political discourse and simply makes the terrorists tyrants in another guise. The following examination of the LTTE’s terrorist activities in Sri Lanka will help to undercut Walzer’s three intertwined assumptions. While there are many significant examples of terrorists who follow Walzer’s assumed pattern, the broad strokes of his account tend to oversimplify and create an overwhelming and unwarranted prejudice against the possibility of ever excusing or justifying terrorism. The case of Sri Lanka Why Sri Lanka? The LTTE provides an interesting case as it has used the tactic of suicide bombing in both discriminate and indiscriminate attacks. Unlike the IRA or ETA whose bombing attacks have at times been characterised as discriminate insofar as warnings were offered or less populated areas targeted, the LTTE has regularly (though not exclusively) employed suicide bombers to directly target the government responsible for their oppression: political leaders, military personnel and equipment, and government offices. In addition, the LTTE has consistently maintained an effective campaign of terror (among their other efforts) during an extended conflict. Hence, this case provides a more useful context for examining the second prejudice regarding the effectiveness of terrorism. Since the Tamil people in Sri Lanka used non-violent resistance for nearly two decades prior to any resort to political violence and the LTTE used guerilla tactics in addition to terrorism, this case provides a useful context for exploring when terrorism may have a distinct effectiveness in contrast to these others approaches. The LTTE has an additional advantage insofar as there is no division between ‘militant’ and ‘political’ wings. As the LTTE lacks such divisions, analysing their willingness to negotiate for peace is less complicated. From a rhetorical standpoint, the LTTE’s 192 S. Kaplan extensive suicide bombing campaigns fit the contemporary image of terrorism in ways that some other examples may not. While not a crucial point, it counters those who might object to specific examples that don’t represent what they take to be the ‘new terrorism’. Last, the case of the LTTE provides an example which addresses all three of the prejudices under consideration in this article, whereas other groups may only prove useful against one or two. Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka Some historical background will be helpful for understanding the ethnic conflict between the Tamil and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka. While the Tamil and Sinhalese peoples are linguistically and culturally distinct, their crystallised identities are much the product of their colonial experience, especially under Britain (1796–1948). The British played the two ethnicities off of one another by initially developing the Sinhalese regions in the plantation model. With the absence of economic development in the Tamil region, many Tamils turned to the educational opportunities offered by the British. Given that Tamils only made up approximately 12% of the total population, they occupied a disproportionately high number of the administrative posts and ‘higher’ professions due to their ability to speak English. The Sinhalese blamed their limited social and economic advancement upon both Britain and the minority populations whom they perceived the British to have favoured. This gave rise to a powerful Sinhalese nationalist movement rooted in ethnic chauvinism. Upon peacefully gaining independence from Britain in 1948, the majority Sinhalese took control of the government through democratic elections and began a legislative backlash against the Tamils. The Sinhalese-authored constitution favoured a strong centralised government that offered little voice or control to other groups, not even in the north-eastern provinces which were nearly 70% Tamil. The successful ‘Sinhala-only’ campaign during the 1956 general elections led to The Official Language Act that made Sinhalese the official language and effectively barred most Tamils from administrative posts and ‘white-collared’ jobs generally (DeVotta 2004). Tamils responded with Ghandian influenced non-violent resistance during the 1950–1960s in the hope of producing constitutional reforms that would protect their rights, culture, and language. The Tamil movement was not yet calling for independence but to establish self-rule in the north-east region. Regardless of their peaceful efforts, further legislation made Buddhism the state religion and a quota system was imposed to limit Tamil admissions to universities. With a growing sense of futility in using non-violent resistance against an unconcerned and unsympathetic majority, a new generation of Tamil resistance that included the LTTE took up arms during the 1970s and called for secession. Large-scale anti-Tamil violence, however, began in 1958 long before the rise of Tamil militancy. Upon a rumor that a Tamil had killed a Sinhalese, nationwide rioting occurred that year resulting in: 300–400 Tamil deaths, 2000 incidents of arson, looting, and assault, as well as 12,000 Tamils being made homeless refugees. Four days after rioting had begun, Wriggins (1960 cited Tambiah 1986, pp. 145–146) reports that a state of emergency was declared where strict censorship of the press was instituted, the Tamil opposition party was banned from Parliament, and tens of thousands of Tamils living in the south and west were forcibly relocated to the north. While anti-Tamil violence continued, additional nationwide riots targeting Tamils erupted in 1977, 1981, and most significantly in 1983. The ambush of 13 Sinhalese soldiers by LTTE forces precipitated the frighteningly organised riots of 1983. The Sinhalese mobs used voters’ lists with detailed addresses to Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Critical Studies on Terrorism 193 locate and burn Tamil homes, businesses, and factories. Government estimates put Tamil deaths at 400 but less conservative estimates put the death toll near 2000. However, the riots also meant the complete destruction of the Tamil economy and led to more than 150,000 Tamils fleeing Sri Lanka for refugee camps in India. In response to the riots, then President Jayewardene claimed that by challenging that Sri Lanka is rightfully a Sinhalese state, the ‘Tamils have brought the wrath of Sinhalese on their own heads; they have themselves to blame’ (Bloom 2005, p. 53). In fear of reprisals following the transparently state-organised violence, the army tortured and killed hundreds of Tamils under the newly legislated Emergency Regulation 15A which ‘allowed security forces to bury or cremate the bodies of people they shot without revealing their identities or carrying out inquests’ (Tambiah 1986, p. 17). Sri Lanka had become a killing field. LTTE terrorism Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 In the aftermath of the 1983 violence, any hope of a constitutional solution evaporated as the opposition party representing Tamils was effectively banned from Parliament by a constitutional amendment.9 With few other avenues for addressing their grievances, more Tamils joined the ranks of militant groups like the LTTE and their popular support skyrocketed. Thus, the first stage of civil war was initiated, commonly referred to as the Eelam War I. Militants engaged in a wide range of armed activities including: guerilla tactics, assassinations of both Sinhalese political leaders and of moderate Tamils who were viewed as collaborators, and bombings of symbolic and military targets, as well as bombings that targeted civilians. During this period, the LTTE’s ruthless campaign of violence and intimidation both eliminated other militant groups and gained them greater public support among Tamils. Bloom (2005, pp. 94–95) argues that resorting to more extreme measures – such as suicide bombing – is often a way for a militant group to ‘outbid’ its rivals by demonstrating its superior commitment and degree of radicalism. When suicide terror first began [1987], there existed a multiplicity of groups vying for public support; suicide terrorism increased the LTTE’s popularity both inside the country and with outside expatriate donors. Once the LTTE reigned supreme, and competition was absent, their willingness to negotiate and compromise increased accordingly. (Bloom 2005, p. 73) The LTTE’s terrorist tactics won them public support both domestically and among Tamil expatriates who helped to fund their operations. While Sinhalese citizens were targeted by suicide bombers, the LTTE also used suicide bombers to target the military, societal infrastructure, and specific politicians. Pape (2003) tabulates that approximately three of four suicide attacks carried out by the LTTE between July 1990 and November 2001 targeted either the Sri Lankan military, police, politicians or government officials. Thus, the LTTE seemingly used both indiscriminate and discriminate terrorism to consolidate and maintain its public support and power in the region. According to Walzer, either democratic means could be used to attain enough public support for non-violent resistance to succeed or those struggling for liberation face a totalitarian regime which will be immune to terrorism. The case of Sri Lanka shows this dichotomy is false. Even when a Tamil opposition party was allowed, the democratically elected government exclusively represented the Sinhalese majority’s interests. Given the powerful Sinhalese chauvinism that had existed for over a century, the majority was simply unconcerned or unsympathetic to Tamil grievances. Thus, the more than two decades of non-violent resistance preceding the LTTE were truly ineffective. 194 S. Kaplan At the same time, the LTTE’s terrorism has been partially successful. Initially, their efforts helped to bring international attention and intervention by the Indian government in 1987. However, when the Indian government brokered a deal for limited devolution without including the LTTE, the LTTE was able to use its terrorist means to force out the Indian troops. With the elimination of rival groups and the peace-keeping forces via terrorist tactics, the Sri Lankan government negotiated directly with the LTTE. This round of negotiations was short lived as the Premadasa government was only willing to devolve the minutia of local administration; thus, Eelam War II commenced in 1990. In the years leading up the general election of 1994, the LTTE used suicide bombers to assassinate the central figures of the ruling UNP – including President Premadasa in 1993 and presidential candidate Dissanayake in 1994. The People’s Alliance party won the elections on a platform of peace via constitutional reforms. The multi-ethnic support for a peace process involving Tamil devolution during these elections could be interpreted as another success for the LTTE. However, the ceasefire and peace talks of 1995 were short lived again due to mutual distrust between the two parties. Following the breakdown of talks, the Sri Lankan military undertook a successful but very costly campaign against the LTTE. This marked the beginning of Eelam War III, which was characterised by an escalation of violence from both sides.10 Simultaneously, the Sri Lankan government unilaterally formulated constitutional reforms regarding devolution. However, the final draft constitution eliminated many of the productive proposals to decentralise power and recognise Tamils as equal members of a multi-ethnic society – due to a need to appease the more conservative elements of the government’s fragile coalition: ‘The devolutionary proposals put forth in 1997 only touched upon autonomy and stopped short of separation (and even shorter of what many Tamils wanted). More significantly, the LTTE had not been consulted about devolution. . .’ (Bloom 2005, p. 61). Just as in the case of The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, a ‘solution’ to the Tamil grievances was proposed without the LTTE’s inclusion in the negotiations. Thus, not only were these proposals rejected by the LTTE as not satisfying their demands for Tamil independence but also for the exclusionary practices of those who drew up these plans. While the LTTE has an ugly history of using terror tactics to quash any dissention from within its own ranks, Walzer’s characterisation of terrorists as always seeking to tyrannically impose their own ‘solutions’ to situations is not entirely fair regarding the LTTE. Not only did they insist on being included in negotiations but initiated serious negotiations and lowered their demands from independence to regional autonomy during the ceasefire of 2002. The Tamils’ general optimism for autonomy and peace saw major setbacks as the Sri Lankan government experienced a power struggle in which their partner in negotiation was the loser in 2004 and during the 2005 presidential elections that brought a hawkish new president who opposed any regional autonomy for Tamils (Sengupta 2005). While the Tamils polled by Bloom (2005, pp. 66–68) during the optimism of 2002 did not support further suicide bombings, suicide attacks resumed as the reasons for their general optimism for peace fell away. Three lessons from Sri Lanka Targeting The history of the LTTE’s terrorist tactics over the years is a mixed one, reflecting how diverse terrorism is. It is clear that the LTTE has engaged in indiscriminate terrorism by directly targeting dissenting Tamils with attacks from suicide bombers. The same can be Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Critical Studies on Terrorism 195 said of their attacks upon Sinhalese non-combatants, such as the widely publicised bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo in 1996. Instances of discriminate terrorism by the LTTE include the use of suicide bombers to: assassinate leading political figures who belong to the ruling political party responsible for Tamil oppression, attack Sinhalese military personnel, and destroy commercial and military property at the international airport and adjoining air force base in 2001. Politicians who come to office on a platform of ethnic bigotry, who incite ethnic violence or who condone those government agents and citizens who commit such ethnic violence, may not directly bear arms against the ethnic minority but do clearly pose a direct threat towards them. The last example listed is especially instructive, as suicide bombers infiltrated the highly guarded airport and destroyed three empty passenger jets and eight military aircraft. The casualties were limited to 13 members of the LTTE and seven soldiers who had opened fire upon them (Dugger 2001). The terror elicited from this widely reported attack had a devastating effect on the Sri Lankan economy which was heavily dependent upon both tourism and foreign investment. Interestingly, this attack elicited terror among those abroad who might visit or invest in Sri Lanka. Simultaneously, the proven ability of the LTTE to so drastically effect Sri Lanka’s economy elicited powerful fear at home. Höglund and Svensson (2003) argue a direct link between the attack upon the airport and the national elections held later that year which ushered in the Wickremesinghe government on a platform of initiating negotiations as a means towards economic recovery. Insofar as these discriminate attacks contributed to the goal of Tamil liberation indirectly through the fear and terror produced not directly by the damage inflicted, they stand as acts of terrorism under the definition proposed above and are not military violence in the conventional sense. Unlike non-terrorist sabotage or assassination where the damage inflicted by the violence directly contributes to their ends, neither the suicide attacks upon military targets and airport nor the political assassinations carried out by suicide bombers were in themselves strategies able to inflict damage that could directly contribute to either a military victory or to overthrowing the ruling party. In fact, however, these strategies in themselves each functioned to elicit a future-oriented fear or terror regarding the life or basic liberties of those within: the military, the governing party, potential tourists, and the broader Sinhalese public. As such, these attacks functioned as an instrument that both affected public opinion as reflected in general elections, and that produced a sense of vulnerability for both the military and those public officials who sanctioned death squads, torture, and other oppressive tactics. The combined result was an increased willingness of the Sinhalese majority to engage in meaningful negotiations. Effectiveness While one might view this new willingness to negotiate as clear evidence of the effectiveness of terrorism, the story is, of course, more complicated as the LTTE simultaneously used other methods, such as guerilla warfare, to combat the Sinhalese regime. It is difficult to answer precisely the degree to which terrorism alone was responsible for bringing about the ceasefire and negotiations that began in 2002. However, as Coady (2004b, p. 90) accurately points out, the important question regarding effectiveness isn’t whether terrorism alone could attain the steps towards liberation but ‘whether terrorism has ever made a crucial, irreplaceable contribution to national liberation (or the achieving of the significant revolutionary goals, whatever they are)’. It is very difficult to deny that the resort to terrorism (e.g., the 2001 airport bombings) has made a crucial and irreplaceable contribution towards the LTTE’s goal of forcing the Sri Lankan state into serious negotiations for the devolution of power.11 Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 196 S. Kaplan Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 What is perfectly clear is that Walzer’s assumed dichotomy rings false in this case. After decades of failed non-violent resistance, the banning of the opposition Tamil party from Parliament, and facing a majority population unconcerned with the Tamil’s grievances, it is hard to see hope in a democratic process leading to meaningful constitutional reforms. Contrary to Walzer’s assumption, this is not the result of a totalitarian regime but a multi-party, parliamentary democracy which has consistently oppressed a minority population. For the concerns of this article, there is enough evidence in the case of Sri Lanka to dismiss the prejudice which presumes terrorism can never be effective in combating oppression. Had the LTTE limited its activities to guerilla warfare or other violence which attempts to attain its ends directly via the damage inflicted, their rebellion would have been isolated by the greater military and economic power of the Sri Lankan State in the northern provinces – far from the voting Sinhalese public. (This has greatly been the case for the LTTE’s guerilla forces since 1995.) However, within this majoritarian nationalist state, the employment of an indirect instrument of terror has been effective in transforming public opinion as expressed in national elections which then ushered in direct negotiations. Walzer might be right that terrorism will be ineffective against a totalitarian regime, yet, he ignores democratic regimes that fail to represent their minority populations unless forced to. These are seemingly the most likely contexts for effective terrorism. Negotiation Walzer’s last assumption that terrorists don’t truly seek a fairly negotiated resolution to their grievances but rather seek to tyrannically impose their own ‘solution’, is also overly simple in light of Sri Lanka. When the LTTE was excluded both from negotiations led by India and from the formulation of proposed constitutional reforms by the Sinhalese government, they violently opposed having such ‘solutions’ imposed by external authorities. In other words, their resort to terrorism has been, at least partially, aimed at being included in the negotiation and settlement of their grievances. Walzer’s assumption that terrorists cannot possibly be participants in legitimate political discourse is further muddied by two additional facts. In the first instance, Bloom’s data show that the resort to suicide bombing helped the LTTE increase membership and financial support by leaps and bounds. For a people denied a meaningful vote, such actions are significant political gestures that give voice to an otherwise mute population. Last, as the LTTE is currently funded by taxes upon Tamils, they have followed in great measure the will of their constituency as witnessed by the 2002 ceasefire and negotiations where demands were lessened from complete independence to regional autonomy. While these negotiations fell into disarray, this needn’t be taken as a sign of a tyrannical unwillingness to participate in meaningful negotiations but may indicate a pressing problem regarding terrorist and anti-terrorist violence. By unleashing the horrors associated with such violence, especially when indiscriminate, the fundamental ground of trust required for future peace is eroded. In the case of Sri Lanka, both sides of this civil war have worn away any remnants of mutual trust by committing atrocities so severe that the hopes of a real and lasting peace are precarious and ephemeral. Concluding comments In a recent response to criticisms posed by McMahan (2006), Walzer (2006b) claims he has only sought to express ‘what terrorism commonly signifies in the real world – most Critical Studies on Terrorism 197 Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 importantly, what it signifies to the men and women who are threatened by it . . . The exceptional example doesn’t bother me, since I am not looking for eternal or necessary truths’. Walzer explicitly makes this claim in response to McMahan’s charges that it is neither a factual truth nor a conceptual truth that terrorists never seek limited political aims and never seek a settlement for peace by means of negotiation. Accordingly, Walzer’s comments above only refer to exceptions to his third prejudice against terrorism. While Walzer (2006a) acknowledges that some ‘terrorists’ may have less totalising political aims than switching places with their oppressors, these are in his mind marginal cases that are not terrorism proper. ‘Sometimes, perhaps, terrorists do have limited purposes – though it might be better to say that sometimes political militants with limited purposes are called terrorists but don’t quite fit the definition’ (Walzer 2006a, pp. 5–6). While the definition referred to here may not be an eternal or necessary truth, it is a firm rule for Walzer by which any number of cases may be excluded as proper examples of terrorism (e.g., the IRA). This same strategy of marginalising ‘exceptional’ cases seems equally available to Walzer when confronted with examples where terrorists (like the LTTE) have been discriminate in their targeting or have had partial success from their resort to terrorism in combating oppression. Perhaps Walzer would respond to my using the example of the LTTE to criticise all three of his assumptions by claiming that the LTTE – when discriminate, effective in combating oppression, or limited in their political goals – are not properly terrorists. Yet, this seems too facile. To call such cases ‘exceptions’ that are either marginal or somehow don’t quite fit the bill, allows Walzer to presume a firm ‘rule’ for terrorism; a rule that although may support his stated political goal of ‘arguing against all excuses and apologies that are made for terrorism and to urge a general condemnation’ (2006b, pp. 20–21), does not capture the full and diverse moral reality and significance of terrorism. Both the functionalist definition and the historical analysis I have offered here aims to dispel those prejudices which impede our ability to critically and concretely understand terrorism in its full moral and political diversity. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. A moral excuse is different than a political excuse which may overlook whatever wrong-doing for the sake of expediency or national interest. While there may be other problems with Coady’s definition (e.g., its vagueness regarding ‘political purposes’ and what sorts of attacks upon non-combatant property might be categorised as terrorism), I will focus only upon the issue of targeting which is at the heart his definition. While Walzer (2004) doesn’t present a formal definition of terrorism, his account follows a similar line of combining indiscriminate targeting and coercive intent. Honderich’s definition remains vague on two levels: (1) insofar as it is unable to provide any meaningful demarcation between small wars and large-scale terrorist campaigns and (2) as Honderich (2006, p. 121) acknowledges, the definition relies upon international law that is by no means firmly established. In addition, Honderich provides no clear argument for why all revolutionary violence ought to be counted as terrorism nor why terrorist tactics can never be resorted to in war. An emphasis upon the indirect instrumental form of terrorism also avoids: Honderich’s vague demarcation based upon the scale of violence, his equating of all domestic revolutionary violence as terrorism, and his definition’s dependence upon international law which is not truly established. However, when the violence only contributes indirectly to the military aims by the terror it elicits, then the military personnel involved can be fairly accused of terrorism. I have elsewhere supported this broad definition in greater detail and provided a typological analysis of those acts that fall under the definition (see Kaplan 2008). Walzer (2000, pp. 263–268) argues along a similar line that the dropping of atomic weapons upon non-combatants in Japan supported the tyrannical demand for unconditional surrender. 5. 6. 7. 8. 198 S. Kaplan The aim was not to reach a mutually accommodating settlement to the war but to impose a ‘solution’ by terrorising a general population. The Sixth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution banned any party calling for secession or home rule. All members of parliament were required to swear an oath to uphold the constitution and all of its amendments, thus leading to all members of the opposition party to leave parliament. The LTTE’s activities included attacks upon the Mullaitivu army camp in the occupied northern territories (killing over 1200 soldiers) and the bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo (killing over 150 civilians and wounding over 1500). On the other hand, the government resorted to strong-armed repression tactics that included razing remote villages, making free use of torture, and sanctioning death squads that carried out a campaign of ‘disappearances’ against Tamils. While a full justification of the LTTE’s terrorist methods would likely require that one show their resort to terrorism to be more effective and less costly than any alternative, I am only arguing that the case of the LTTE shows that terrorism can be effective in combating oppression. 9. 10. 11. References Downloaded By: [Kaplan, Shawn] At: 12:49 10 September 2009 Bloom, M., 2005. Dying to kill: the allure of suicide terror. New York: Columbia University Press. Chomsky, N., 2001. 9/11. New York: Seven Storied Press. Coady, C.A.J., 2004a. Defining terrorism. In: I. Primoratz, ed. Terrorism: the philosophical issues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3–14. Coady, C.A.J., 2004b. Terrorism, morality, and supreme emergency. In: I. Primoratz, ed. 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